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To cite this article: John L. Crompton (2016) A policy framework for analyzing multi-use pass pricing decisions, *Managing Sport and Leisure*, 21:2, 91-101, DOI: [10.1080/23750472.2016.1209979](https://doi.org/10.1080/23750472.2016.1209979)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/23750472.2016.1209979>



Published online: 22 Jul 2016.



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# A policy framework for analyzing multi-use pass pricing decisions

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The multi-use pass is widely used by public sport and leisure agencies. Typically, it offers users a potential discount on price for a season or year. Decisions on pricing these passes often are reflexive and imitative, rather than thoughtful and explicitly analytical. This paper provides a policy framework composed of four dimensions that should be analyzed in multi-use pass pricing decisions. The first three are: encouragement of commitment; potential for leveraging more revenues from existing users; and adherence to the Benefit Principle. The analysis of these dimensions assumes the pricing goal is to maximize revenues. The fourth dimension, adherence to the Ability to Pay Principle, recognizes that maximizing revenues has to be reconciled with the obligation of agencies to be inclusive.

**Keywords:** multi-use pass, policy framework, pricing decisions, dimensions

The multi-use pass is a staple pricing option offered by almost all leisure agencies. It has long been a part of the field's conventional practice. Such passes invariably offer discounts for annual, seasonal or multi-use access to facilities such as swimming pools, golf courses and arts complexes.<sup>1</sup> However, too often in the author's experience in the U.S. as an elected official, consultant and professional in the leisure field, when managers are asked why multi-use passes are offered typical responses are "I am not sure I know why we do it except that it has always been done here"; or "We do it because every other leisure agency does it and it is expected of us." In short, their adoption often appears to be attributable to tradition and inertia,

rather than to a conscious weighting of the relative merits of all the factors involved.

Hence, the purpose of this paper is to offer a policy analyses framework which identifies, describes and analyses the array of issues that should be considered in multi-use pass pricing decisions. There can be no "one right answer." Since community norms and value systems vary widely, policies adopted by communities are likely to be substantially different. The important questions are: How will decision makers make their decisions? And, on the basis of what information will they act? (Patton, Sawicki, & Clark, 2016).

The process for rational policy-making is widely recognized as (i) define the problem;

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<sup>1</sup>In some communities, public leisure facilities offer residents a "membership". In essence, this is a synonym for the multi-pass. This choice of nomenclature is potentially misleading because it connotes exclusivity, which is appropriate for private organizations but seems antithetical to an agency's mandate to be inclusive and open to all.

(ii) select evaluation criteria; (iii) identify and evaluate alternative policies; and (iv) select and implement the preferred option (Patton et al., 2016). The policy framework offered in this paper is intended to inform the operationalization of this rationalist model.

In any given community that community's norms will serve as the criteria used to determine what constitutes a "good" multi-use pass price. The author's experience suggests that such criteria may include: encouraging a broader base of participation; encouraging greater levels of participation among existing users; consistency with a prevailing political philosophy; optimizing fairness; reducing subsidies by increasing revenues; or reducing an unfair competitive advantage over commercial or nonprofit providers of similar services. Good decisions require consideration of all dimensions of an issue. When decision makers are confronted with such conflicting objectives, inconsistencies or unintended consequences are likely to occur when decisions are reflexive based only on inertia, past practice, or prevailing conventional wisdom.

### THE PREVAILING FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT

Most elected officials are now under relentless pressure from their constituents to lower, or at least not to raise, taxes. The mantra that guided leisure agencies after the tax revolt that dominated the political agenda in the 1970s and 1980s in the U.S., Canada, U.K., Australia and New Zealand was: Do more with less (Crompton, 2009). This was pursued by robustly cutting costs. In most agencies, costs have now been pared to the bone. A complementary mantra that subsequently emerged was: Do more with more, which means raising prices to create self-generated revenue that can be used to fund additional services.

This recognizes that support from many elected officials for new services is likely to depend on the services being relatively self-sufficient (Crompton, 2016).

This revised mantra is reflected in the emergence of the term "net budget" in the U.S., which is defined as the tax-supported portion of an agency's budget. During budget discussions, if a director reports no increase in the net budget, it is likely to meet with approval. The gross budget may increase, but if the increases are funded by program-generated revenues, elected officials are unlikely to be concerned (Crompton, 2010).

Hence, the prevailing contemporary mantra of this field is: Do more with more (but not tax funding). This shift is apparent in the data. In the U.S., the proportion of local leisure agencies' operating budgets raised from non-tax, self-generated revenues increased from 14% to 34% between 1964/1965 and 1999/2000 (Crompton & Kaczynski, 2003); now accounts for approximately 40% of all state parks' operating budgets (Crompton & Kaczynski, 2004; Walls, 2013); and increased from 3% to 12% of the National Parks Service's operating budget between 2004 and 2014.

The first three policy dimensions discussed in the paper are: Encouragement of commitment; potential for leveraging more revenues from existing users; and adherence to the Benefit Principle. Consistent with the prevailing financial environment, the discussion of these dimensions assumes the primary goal is to maximize revenue. The fourth dimension, adherence to the Ability to Pay Principle, recognizes that a revenue maximization goal has to be reconciled with the obligation of public leisure agencies not to exclude residents from participating because they lack the funds to do so. This trade-offs between revenue maximization and ability to pay will be resolved differently across different political jurisdictions.

## ENCOURAGEMENT OF COMMITMENT

It has been suggested that the multi-use pass is analogous to the quantity discount, which is widely used in the private sector (Crompton, 2013). In that context it is offered for two reasons. First, cost savings may accrue to businesses from: (i) larger orders that justify longer production runs which may result in lower per unit costs; (ii) reduced logistics costs since there will be fewer orders to process, ship and invoice; (iii) transference of costs of storage and financing of inventory from seller to buyer; and (iv) reduced per unit processing expenses, since costs of billing, order filling and salespeople salaries are about the same for orders totaling \$100 or \$1000. However, these cost savings are confined to manufactured products and generally are not applicable to leisure services.

The complementary rationale for private sector quantity discounts is that they commit the purchaser to using a product for the duration of the time period for which the quantity lasts, rather than changing to a competitor's product. Thus, *ipso facto* they induce commitment and loyalty. This rationale does transition to the context of leisure services. The commitment is explained by two behavioral theories.

First, the endowment effect recognizes people ascribe more value to a service when they own it, that is, they have paid for it (Thaler, 1980). Over a century ago, one of America's most revered Supreme Court Justices, Oliver Wendel Holmes, observed: "A thing which you enjoyed and used as your own for a long time, whether property or opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn away without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself" (Holmes, 1897, p. 673).

Consistent with Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), users of a service are likely to regard its potential loss as more

significant than the benefits they anticipate would accrue if they were to purchase it on a per-visit basis. Thus, for example, the price for which an individual would be prepared to sell a ticket to a popular sport event (Krueger, 2001) or a permit for a hunting opportunity (Bishop & Heberlein, 1979) is generally much higher than the price he or she would be willing to pay for it. This has been empirically confirmed in a large number of studies (Horowitz & McConnell, 2002).

A second factor that encourages greater use if people have pre-paid for a service is the sunk cost pressure effect which is defined as a "greater tendency to continue an endeavor once an investment in money, time or effort has been made" (Arkes & Blumer, 1985, p. 125). Sunk cost is the term used to describe irrecoverable costs. These are expenditures that cannot be reclaimed once they have been incurred. Traditionally, economists have argued that it is not rational to allow historical costs to influence future decisions. Individuals may regret an investment, but that money is gone. They should get over it and move forward rather than allow attempts to justify it to influence future decisions. A rational decision maker is only interested in the future consequences of current investments.

Loss aversion, however, which is a central tenet of Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), induces sunk cost pressure and renders the traditional economic perspective incomplete. People often feel obligated to use a service despite not wanting to do so, because they have misgivings about "wasting" their investment. There is an "irrational perseverance" whereby people "give up rationality rather than give up the enterprise" (Kahneman, 2011 p. 267). Consider the following scenario:

A man pays a \$500 yearly membership fee to join a tennis club. After one week of playing he develops tennis elbow. He continues to

play (in pain) saying, “I don’t want to waste the \$500.” (Monger & Feinberg, 1977, p. 47)

He wants to feel he is getting “value for money.” A sunk cost investment creates a level of emotional commitment to a course of action beyond that of others who have less “skin in the game.” People may be persuaded to make full use of a multi-use pass investment because not doing so would mean accepting it was an unwise expenditure and admitting failure.

### POTENTIAL FOR LEVERAGING MORE REVENUES FROM EXISTING USERS

There are two potential strategies where the multi-use pass may be used to leverage more revenue from existing users. Because it commits a purchaser to using an agency’s service for an extended time, it may be used as a “loss leader” in contexts where there are likely to be additional expenditures beyond the admission price. For example, at a golf course the multi-pass holder is likely to rent a golf cart and make purchases in the golf shop, concessions and food areas. The agency’s profits from these purchases may more than offset revenues lost by discounting the admission price to pass holders.

The second opportunity for leverage is in contexts where revenue is maximized by aggregating different programs together and charging a single price for them. This occurs when there is a difference in demand for related services, so users value them differently. As a result, a price charged for the bundled services is lower than the combined prices of the services when they are priced separately. This strategy is often adopted by agencies that have programs in the performing arts. People are likely to vary in their preferences. Some may enjoy classical music rather than ballet, or Shakespeare rather than Miller or Pinter. The price they are willing to pay for individual tickets for each of the (say) five

performances that comprise a season is likely to vary according to these preferences. The principle can be illustrated by considering the price sensitivity of two prospective audience members for two different performances:

- Person A is prepared to pay \$40 to watch the ballet, but only \$20 to listen to the symphony. Person B holds the polar opposite view and would pay \$20 for the ballet, but \$40 for the symphony. Person C is prepared to pay \$30 for each show. If all tickets are priced at \$30, then the revenues generated will be \$120 (\$30 from person A and person B and \$60 from person C). If a combined ticket is available for \$55 for both shows, then person A and person B who were prepared to pay \$60 for both shows would buy it, and so would person C who would save \$5. Thus, the revenues from combined passes would be \$165, that is, \$45 more than if the tickets were sold individually.

Because the aggregated price is lower than the summated prices of the individual programs, it is likely to be perceived as a discount, which would reinforce its appeal (Smith, 2012).

### ADHERENCE TO THE BENEFIT PRINCIPLE

The Benefit Principle was first advocated by Thomas Hobbs and John Locke in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Crompton & West, 2008). It directs that the benefits people receive from leisure services should be reflected in the contributions they make to paying for those services. This is a bedrock principle of contemporary “fiscal conservatism.” Since multi-use passes are invariably discounted, those who purchase them receive two increments of financial benefit that do not accrue to those who pay a per-visit price. First, if a per-visit subsidy is calculated by dividing costs of a service by number of visits, then because they

make more visits, frequent users receive a greater proportion of the aggregate subsidy. Second, pass holders pay a lower per-visit fee. These points are illustrated in the following scenario:

- Annual swimming pool revenues are \$250,000 while operating costs are \$550,000, so the net cost of operating the pool is \$300,000. Annual attendance is 200,000 visits, so each visit is subsidized by \$1.50. An adult annual pass holder pays \$200 and uses it 100 times, so his/her cost per visit is \$2 and aggregate subsidy from the taxpayers is \$150 (100 visits  $\times$  \$1.50 per-visit subsidy). In contrast, the user who visits the pool 10 times a year pays the much higher per-visit admission price of \$5 and receives the much lower aggregate subsidy of \$15.

The potential revenue that is forgone from a discount received by pass holders means either taxpayers have to provide a larger subsidy, or if no subsidy is authorized then other users will be required to pay a higher price. Both outcomes abuse the Benefit Principle, since pass holders are paying less than their equitable share of the costs.

A not altogether facetious case can be made that the frequent swimmer should pay a higher price than the occasional swimmer, not a lower price. It seems likely that the primary pressure for building and operating pools will come from heavy users who will be the main beneficiaries. Their heavy use indicates that the activity is a central element of their lifestyle and, as such, their demand is likely to be much more price inelastic than that of occasional users. Because they are the primary source of the operating deficits, it may be argued that given their relative price inelasticity they should pay more per visit, not less. Consider the following case:

- A large \$45 million public aquatic and recreation center attracted 1.05 million

visits annually. Of these, 745,000 (71%) were accounted for by members who purchased an annual pass. The 11,000 members accounted for only 2.4% of the 450,000 population, so the vast majority of use was by a very small proportion of the population. Multiple forms of membership were available, but the most popular was a \$1000 annual pass, while a day pass was \$25 (Marriott, 2013).

In this case, is it appropriate to offer an annual pass which, by definition, suggests the pass holders anticipate receiving a discount, rather than requiring all to pay the per-visit price? Is it appropriate for taxpayers to be funding facilities that charge such high prices, serve such small proportions of the community and presumably exclude large segments of the community who cannot afford these prices? The author of this research commented: "It is a public venue that seeks to serve everyone in the community and is not" (Marriott, 2013, p.7).

In the case of some facilities, such as swimming pools, public agencies often are monopolists in that they are the only provider of those services in the community. The purchasers of multi-use passes are likely to be the most avid and committed users. Thus, given the lack of other suppliers, if a pass was not available it seems reasonable to conjecture there would be a high probability most of them would visit just as frequently and would pay the regular per-visit price.

From a financial perspective, the negative impact of multi-use discounts is especially pernicious if they are contributing to creating congestion which sometimes occurs, for example, on public golf courses. Clearly, it is disadvantageous to have them squeeze out participants who are willing to pay the regular price at peak times.

In the context of parks that have an admission price and are accessed primarily by automobile, the volume discount often



applies not only to number of visits, but also to the number of individuals in an automobile. Designating the automobile as the unit to be priced rather than individuals may be administratively convenient, but it abuses the Benefit Principle and reduces potential revenues. If the per vehicle admission price is \$5 and there are five people in the car, then the cost is \$1 per person. However, if there are two people in the car, the cost to them is \$2.50 per person. That is inequitable.

All else equal, it is likely that the five people will adversely impact the resource more than the two people, but they pay a lower price. It is individuals who are likely to cause much of the damage, wear and deterioration of the resource and who create the need for more staffing, more regulation and more services in a park. Further, when the price is tied to a vehicle, efforts to avoid paying it sometimes result in vehicles being parked outside the park on shoulders of highways. This creates not only a traffic hazard, but also a potential danger to vehicle occupants traversing the roads when going to and from the park.

### Two caveats

There are two caveats which qualify the above suggestion that multi-use pass holders often receive more benefits than they pay for. First, inequity under the Benefit Principle sometimes works against multi-pass holders, since some of them are likely to make an incorrect decision. If they use a service substantially less frequently than they anticipated, then they may have paid more per visit than if they had opted for the per-visit price. For example, three private health and fitness clubs offered two payment options: a per-visit price of \$10 or a monthly contract of \$70–85 which was automatically debited to a bank account until the user canceled. A review of the records of 7752 members revealed that 80%

of the monthly members would have been better off had they paid per visit for the same number of visits. On average, they attended 4–5 times a month, paying an effective price between \$15.50 and \$19. They paid 70% more than they would have done if they had paid the per-visit fee (DellaVigna & Malmendier, 2006).

Concern relating to this issue is likely to increase if some pass holders are relatively economically disadvantaged. No empirical research has been reported on sociodemographic differences between pass holders and per-visit payers. However, it seems plausible that the economically disadvantaged are less likely to be able to afford the substantial up-front payment needed to purchase a pass.

In cases like this when users make an incorrect decision, the issue becomes: Is it fair that people should pay for visits they do not use? In a commercial context, if the focus is on short-term profitability then the response may be *caveat emptor*, let the buyer beware, that is, responsibility for the purchase outcome is exclusively the buyers. Such a response by public agencies is unlikely to be acceptable. Given their ethical code requires they operate both transparently and equitably, it is unlikely many will accept it is appropriate to exploit users who are overly optimistic in their attendance estimates and who consequently pay more by purchasing a “discount” pass than if they paid a per-visit price.

If a long-term perspective is adopted, then retention of users becomes the focus. High up-front costs can be removed by spreading the pass payments over a period of time. This approach also reinforces the nexus between benefits received and payments made. Hence, the sunk cost effect that was described earlier in the paper is strengthened. This phenomenon was illustrated in a study of payment plans at a health club. (Gourville & Soman, 1998). All members paid the same annualized membership fee,

but they could select from four payment plans: (a) pay the whole fee once a year, (b) pay half the fee every six months, (c) pay a quarter of the fee every three months or (d) pay one-twelfth of the fee every month. The usage rate of the club's facilities among those selecting option (d) was approximately constant every month. The authors suggested these users felt sunk cost pressure to work out regularly each month to justify their investment. Those selecting the other three options felt this pressure immediately after their payment, but their drive dissipated as the pain of the cost faded into the past:

Members who made a single annual payment used the club most frequently in the months immediately following payment, reflecting a strong nexus between service use and time of payment. But as time passed, the effect dissipated. By the final months, individuals seemed to be treating their memberships as if they were free and worked out at a rate that was only a quarter of what it had been in the first few months. The same pattern held for members who had paid on a semi-annual or quarterly basis: Attendance was highest immediately following payment, only to decline steadily until the next payment. This resulted in a saw-tooth pattern of usage, spiking in the first and seventh months for semiannual payment members and every three months for quarterly members. (Gourville & Soman, 2002, p. 94)

The emotional influence exerted by sunk cost pressure is likely to depreciate over time. When payment is made at the time of use, this pressure is high and people feel compelled to use a service to avoid feeling they have wasted their money. In contrast, if an annual pass is purchased, a decline in sunk cost pressure to use the service as the year progresses is likely. As the pain of paying fades from memory, the decay effect is reinforced by adaptation, as the cost no longer forms part of an individual's financial

status quo. The new status quo becomes the reference standard against which the decision to use a service is made. This has been termed "payment depreciation" (Gourville & Soman, 1998). There is a gradual discounting of the initial price over time until ultimately the service takes on the characteristics of a free good. At that point, the reference standard is not the original monetary price paid. Rather, an individual evaluates only if the benefits accruing from the service outweigh the costs of immediate constraints associated with the activity, such as time availability, travel costs, amount of effort and adverse weather. The discounting or discarding of the initial monetary price and its disconnect with the benefits being received, increases the probability the service will not be used. If people cease to use a service over time, they are likely to balk when requested to renew their payment in the future.

A second caveat which argues against the contention that multi-use passes often abrogate the Benefit Principle is that high fixed costs and relatively low variable costs are invariably associated with facilities like swimming pools. This means that number of visits has relatively little impact on costs of operation. Thus, while conceptually heavy users benefit most from a tax subsidy, in reality the number of visits is not likely to influence the magnitude of the subsidy.

### **Eroding the discount**

In the author's experience, many elected officials and professionals who seek to maximize revenues express a desire to remove or substantially erode the discount incorporated into multi-use passes, but they find it difficult to accomplish. Whenever additional costs are imposed or benefits are removed from a clientele group, protest is likely as users seek to protect their privileged position. Protests are especially probable in this context,



because multi-use pass holders as the heaviest users are likely to exhibit the strongest endowment and sunk cost effects, making it likely they will be most aggressive in protesting any changes to the pass structure that negatively impacts them. Further, these passes frequently have a long heritage so they are ensconced in a community's conventional wisdom.

There are four strategies, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive and may be used in some combination, that might be helpful in navigating this difficult political environment. First, suggest replacing the multi-use pass with a frequent purchase card. For example, after (say) five visits the sixth is free. Second, an alternative version would be to count single visits towards the cost of a multi-use pass. For example, if an annual pass is \$100 and the per-visit price is \$5, then the pass would be issued to users who record 20 annual visits. Both of these approaches ensure lower income users who cannot afford the up-front fee and pass holders who make overly optimistic attendance estimates are treated equitably.

Third, offer a minimally or non-discounted convenience pass. This would accommodate frequent users who buy a pass not for the monetary savings, but for the convenience of not having to carry cash or credit cards when they engage in a leisure activity.

Fourth, use data to recalibrate the price of a pass and so remove the arbitrariness of the pricing decision. Many passes are now "swipe cards" or phone apps which makes it easy to identify the average number of visits by users. Alternatively, this can be done by questioning a sample of pass holders. These data then can be used to determine the desired discount. For example, if the per-visit price is \$5, the average number of visits is 40, and the desired discount is 25%, then the pass would be priced at \$150 ( $\$5 \times 40 \times .75$ ).

## ADHERENCE TO THE ABILITY TO PAY PRINCIPLE

When Adam Smith wrote his foundation treatise on capitalism in 1776 he stated:

The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state. The expense of government to the individuals of a great nation, is like the expense of management to the joint tenants of a great estate, who are all obliged to contribute in proportion to their respective interests in the estate. (Smith, 1776, p. 825)

In these two sentences, Smith recognized the two concepts of fairness that remain the contemporary principles for guiding decisions on equity in taxation and in pricing. First, the Benefit Principle by which each taxpayer or service user's contribution should reflect the benefits he or she receives from the service. Smith observed: "It seems scarce possible to invent a more equitable way of maintaining such works" (p. 725). Second, the price to be paid should reflect people's different ability to pay.

If an agency is myopically focused on reducing subsidies and raising revenues, this can relatively easily be accomplished by targeting only responsive, middle-class clienteles and ignoring the economically disadvantaged, unskilled and disinterested target markets that are much more costly to access and are either unable or unwilling to pay a break-even price. These clienteles are not provided with leisure programs by the private sector and thus are part of the *raison d'être* for a public agency.

Hence, the central conundrum in public sector pricing decisions is how to optimally reconcile the Benefit Principle with the Ability to Pay Principle, which recognizes a community's obligation to provide opportunities to all residents and directs that none

should be excluded from participating because they lack the funds to do so. If this dimension is ignored, the result may be that revenue maximization dictates and drives the mission rather than contributes to it. This may be manifested by subsidized services being reduced, ignored or terminated, while those which are self-sustaining flourish even though the former are more important to accomplishing the agency's primary mission. For example, in the U.K., the expressed priority of central and local government was to improve access of disadvantaged groups to public sector sports and leisure centers. However, from an analysis of comprehensive national participation data, it was concluded: "The implication is that stronger cost recovery will cause weaker performance in low socio-economic groups' access" (Taylor, Panagouleas, & Kung, 2011, p. 139).

Ostensibly, the Ability to Pay Principle suggests that a multi-use pass should be priced low so it encourages those who are economically disadvantaged to participate more frequently. However, this means substantial consumers' surplus revenues will be foregone by the agency and the discounts would accrue to those who could most afford to pay which would abrogate the principle. Failure to charge those who can afford to pay means fewer resources would be available to subsidize more services for the economically disadvantaged. Further, if the economically disadvantaged are not major users of a service, then this approach means their taxes (the alternative funding source to pricing revenues) are used to subsidize wealthier participants. This creates a distorted payment system that leads to inverse income redistribution and may be counter to a community's prevailing equity norm.

An alternative approach is to differentially price services so the economically disadvantaged pay a lower price for a pass than others. The challenge is to implement this

in such a way that they are not stigmatized. The dimensions of this issue have been discussed elsewhere in the literature (Collins, 2005; McCarville, 2008; Trusell & Mair, 2010).

### **The potential influence of a subsidized pass on agency accountability**

Since a multi-use pass purchase invariably represents a discount, the cost per visit is lower than if a per-visit price was paid. Classic economic theory suggests this is likely to result in individuals participating more frequently. If this occurs there are two potential positive outcomes for enhancing an agency's performance accountability in the eyes of elected officials.

First, for better or worse, number of visits is the accountability criterion frequently adopted by agency personnel in reports to taxpayers and elected officials, so increases in them may be influential in demonstrating their "success" and in subsequent budget allocations.

Second, to earn more support from elected officials and taxpayers, some agencies are repositioning services so they better align with contemporary concerns relating to health care costs. The more time individuals invest in exercising, which is a potential outcome from greater use, the stronger the agency's health position is likely to be in the public mindset.

### **CONCLUDING COMMENTS**

Pricing is one of the most technically difficult and politically sensitive areas in which leisure managers have to make decisions. Pricing decisions are influenced by myriad ideological, political and professional arguments. For this reason, resolution of the issues discussed in this paper will be context specific. They cannot be formulaic. A one-size-fits-all approach cannot work. A multi-use pass pricing policy that has proved successful in one community may

be entirely inappropriate in another. Community perspectives are different, and the expectations of stakeholders vary.

Unfortunately, many good managers and elected officials make poor pricing decisions. Too often they are based on "the way we've always done it." In the past, when only relatively nominal prices were charged, the underlying rationale for a multi-use pass price was not likely to be challenged. This has changed as demands for greater transparency in government have grown. The policy analysis framework presented here offers an alternative to arbitrary decision-making and provides a strong conceptual scaffolding upon which to construct an effective policy. Its adoption would facilitate the justification increasingly required of agency managers and elected officials to demonstrate their decisions are neither arbitrary nor inequitable.

### DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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